Abstract-Prior research has established that consumption falls significantly at retirement. What is not known is the extent to which this fall is anticipated during the working years. Using data from a new survey, we show that many working households do expect a considerable fall in consumption when they retire. In fact, those who are already retired report significantly smaller falls in consumption than are expected by those who are still working.
I. Introduction
T HE facts are not in dispute. Many households spend a great deal less after retirement than they did before (Hamermesh, 1984; Mariger, 1987) . 1 Yet the interpretation is hotly disputed. Is or is not this finding consistent with standard theories of saving? Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) argue that absent large shocks, the fall in consumption expenditure is too large to be explained in the life cycle framework: "The only way to reconcile fully the fall in consumption with the life cycle hypothesis is with the systematic arrival of unexpected adverse information." Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) go one step further, and argue that the "unexpected" information is the level of retirement wealth itself: "Many retirees . . . take stock of their finances only to discover that their resources are insufficient to maintain their accustomed standard of living." If correct, this argues not only against the life cycle model, but against all forward-looking theories of consumption. 2 Both of these studies suggest that realized levels of consumption in retirement systematically disappoint expectations. But because these studies focus solely on realizations, the evidence for disappointment is incomplete. What is missing is an analysis of expected consumption levels among those who are approaching retirement. Improved understanding of these expectations is critical not only for purposes of discriminating among economic models, but also for deepening our understanding of the process of wealth accumulation. It is also vital to the current debate on the adequacy of the U.S. savings rate (Engen, Gale, & Uccello, 1999; Mitchell, Hammond, & Rappaport, 2000) .
In this paper we use new data from two recent surveys of some 2,000 TIAA-CREF participants to improve our understanding of both expected consumption levels among those who are approaching retirement, and realized consumption among those who recently retired. Section II provides a description of the surveys and our sample, which is highly nonrepresentative. Our findings on expected consumption are outlined in section III. We find that households in the preretirement period generally expect significant falls in spending at retirement. In quantitative terms, our results on expectations suggest that a typical U.S. household expects roughly a 20% fall in consumption at retirement, which is in line with the findings of Bernheim et al. (2001) on realized consumption levels. We find substantial heterogeneity in expectations. Whereas on average households anticipate declines in spending, many households anticipate no change in spending or even increases in spending upon retirement. Our data also reveal that, on average, less wealthy households anticipate a greater fall in consumption than do wealthy households, matching Bernheim et al.'s finding concerning outcomes. Section IV analyzes consumption realizations among retirees. Rather than having unexpectedly low consumption due to adverse shocks, many retired households appear to be consuming more than expected. This finding and the possible explanations for it are detailed in section IV.
Our results do not support the claim that the fall in spending at retirement represents a surprise to households. Hurd and Rohwedder (2005) have produced complementary evidence indicating the extent to which actual declines in spending at retirement are anticipated. Together, these findings suggest the value of exploring theories in which a significant fall in spending at retirement is anticipated well in advance.
II. Background

A. The Surveys
The data used in this paper are drawn primarily from two surveys sent to a sample of TIAA-CREF participants: the Survey of Participant Finances (SPF) conducted in January 2000, and the Survey of Financial Attitudes and Behavior (FAB) conducted in January 2001. The SPF was designed to examine in detail the type and the amount of financial assets owned by a sample of TIAA-CREF participants. The FAB explored these participants' financial preferences, expectations, and attitudes. The sample for both surveys comprises members of the "TIAA-CREF Research Panel." This panel started in 1993 as a random stratified sample of TIAA-CREF participants, but subsequent replacements were not designed in a manner that preserved randomness.
At the end of 1999, the research panel comprised some 9,234 households. The SPF was mailed to this group in January 2000. In total, 2,835 households responded to that survey, for an overall response rate of 30.7%. The universe for the FAB comprised 2,687 of the 2,835 households who had responded to the SPF; the difference being accounted for by changes of address, death, requests to be removed from the panel, and so forth. We followed procedures suggested by Dillman (1978) to boost the response rate, and 2,064 of the 2,687 households responded to the FAB (76.8%).
B. The Sample
We divide our sample into two groups based on labor force participation. To preserve a clear distinction between retired and nonretired households in multiperson households, we define the household to be working only if no adult member is retired, and to be retired only if all adults are retired. Of the 2,064 respondents who filled out the FAB, 1,074 were in working households, while 735 were in retired households. The remaining 255 respondents either were in partially retired households or provided insufficient data to be clearly categorized. These households were therefore left out of the analysis. Table 1 shows demographic information on the working and the retired households in the sample. The educational and occupational characteristics of the retired households in our sample are very similar to those of the working households. Not surprisingly, given our data source, the sample is extremely well educated. Roughly one in three have PhDs, while fully 70% undertook at least some postcollege education. In terms of employment, more than one in three are teaching faculty, while the majority of the others have management or professional positions. However, some 20% of the sample are in more blue collar jobs, such as maintenance and secretarial positions. Table 2 presents additional qualitative data on our sample, including information on home ownership, retiree health and long-term-care insurance coverage, and definedbenefit pension plan coverage. The table shows that a very high proportion of the sample own their homes rather than rent them. The majority of working owners have positive balances remaining on their mortgages, while the majority of retired owners have no remaining mortgage. With respect to healthcare, roughly 50% of households have at least one member of the household with employer-provided health insurance extending into retirement, but very few have coverage for long-term care. About a quarter of the respondents in working households, and a third of those in retired households, indicated that they participate in a definedbenefit pension plan (of course, this pension plan is in addition to any TIAA-CREF and/or other definedcontribution pension plans). Table 3 contains economic data on the working and retired households in the sample. We have not only measures of total net worth, but also the breakdown among various subcategories of assets and debts. Complete wealth data was provided by 55% of those who are working households, and 40% of retired households. 3 Among the working households in our sample, the mean level of employment income in 1999 is $87,000, with a median of $73,000. The mean level of total net worth in 1999 among the working households in our sample is $737,000, with a median of $368,000. Clearly these are far higher (especially the wealth numbers) than for the general population.
The survey data that we are using clearly do not comprise a representative sample of the U.S. population, and we do not argue that our results can be construed as population estimates. Yet it is unclear why such selection would systematically bias our analysis of behavior and retirement expectations and outcomes. One benefit of our sample is that higher education and research has historically been a stable industry, making possible the analysis of financial choices in an economic environment that is relatively isolated from exogenous disturbances.
C. The Questions
We asked survey participants to respond to the following question on retirement consumption. In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to this as the retirement-consumption question.
• For many households, overall spending changes dramatically upon retirement. This question is designed to accord with the commonsense notion of consumption as directly tied to expenditures, rather than the "flow of consumption services" notion that accords more closely with economic theory. On the one hand, this makes our question easy to understand, which may have contributed to the high response rates. On the other hand, it exposes us to potential ambiguities, such as whether respondents include debt repayments (especially mortgage payments) as part of their overall spending. Fortunately, we have a great deal of data enabling us to explore these and other possible ambiguities, as outlined in section IV. 4 In the second part of the retirement-consumption question, we asked for more precision from those who reported either a change or an expected change in spending at retirement:
• About how much more or less (as a percentage of your annual preretirement spending)?
We imputed an answer of 0 to this question for all those who responded with "no change" to the first part of the consumption question.
The vast majority of respondents answered the retirementconsumption question. Of the sample, 90% answered the first part, and of those who were eligible, 90% provided a closest estimate in the second part. Conditioning on the response to these questions does not affect the economic or demographic characteristics of the sample in any significant way. Source: Authors' tabulation of 2000 and 2001 survey data. Notes: "Earnings" is the reported level of household taxable income from employment in the calendar year 1999. "Total financial assets" is the sum of all retirement account balances, mutual funds (except real estate mutual funds), directly held stocks, directly held bonds, checking accounts, savings accounts, and CDs. "Total assets" is total financial assets plus the value of homes and other real estate. "Total net worth" is total assets minus mortgage debt, outstanding educational loans, outstanding personal loans, and credit card balances. All aggregates exclude the value of real estate mutual funds, whole life insurance policies, trusts, and educational savings accounts (Education IRAs and 529 plans). All wealth data are as of December 31, 1999.
III. Findings
Figures 1 and 2 present the distribution of responses for working and retired households, respectively. Several features of the data are immediately apparent. First, there is substantial heterogeneity in expectations. Most prominent is the spike at 0. There are two reasons for this, both of which are related to the fact that we have imputed a value of 0 for those who report "no change" to the first part of the consumption question. The first is the failure of some of those who report actual or expected changes in the first part of the consumption question to provide a numerical value in the second part. In this sense, we oversample those who report "no change." In the empirical analysis below, we reweight the data to reflect these sampling probabilities where appropriate.
The second reason for the spike at 0 is that respondents appear to have reported no change instead of small positive and negative changes. 5 Given the negative tilt of the distribution, this probably biases us against finding expected declines in consumption by working households. In an earlier version of the paper, we modeled the rounding process, estimated the underlying distribution, and found this bias to be quite small (see Ameriks, Caplin, & Leahy, 2002) . We therefore ignore rounding in what follows.
A second feature of the data is that 5% of households reported expected falls in consumption of either 80% or 90%. Not only do such huge declines in consumption seem a priori unlikely, but also there were very few households in the 51%-79% range. 6 We view these data points as suspect and therefore exclude them from the analysis below. Note that this correction again works against the hypothesis that agents anticipate a decline in consumption at retirement. 7 A casual look at figures 1 and 2 does not reveal any indication that our consumers are surprised by declines in consumption at retirement. If anything, the working appear to expect a decline that is greater than that which is realized by the retired. In what follows we take a more formal look at these features of the data. Table 4 presents basic summary statistics concerning the answers to the retirement-consumption question among working households. We present data both for the entire working population and for a second group, the "regression sample." The regression sample, which is used in tables 5 and 6, satisfies the two conditions: respondents report that they are no more than twenty years to retirement and provide complete wealth data. 8 We begin with a sample of 1,074 working households. About one-half provide complete wealth data. About 60% of the remainder expect to retire within twenty years. This leaves us with just over 300 observations in the regression sample. Table 4 makes clear what is apparent from figure 1: the majority of households expect consumption in retirement to fall, with a mean expected fall of just over 11%. The table also reveals profound heterogeneity of expectations. The mean expected fall in consumption among those expecting 5 There is also evidence of rounding to the nearest 5 and 10. 6 It is possible that these households reported the "replacement rate" (the ratio of retirement spending to preretirement spending) rather than the fall in spending. The demographic characteristics of this group are closer to those who expect small declines than large declines. A model in which a certain fraction of respondents mistakenly report 100-x instead of x fits the data remarkably well. See Ameriks et al. (2002) . 7 We tried a number of robustness checks. We included these observations as reported, we truncated the sample at Ϫ50%, we assumed those reporting declines greater than 50% incorrectly reported the replacement ratio, and we imputed observations following footnote 6. These adjustments do not affect the qualitative conclusions of our analysis. 8 We limit our analysis to households who are no more than twenty years from retirement to retain some degree of homogeneity. In fact, our data suggest that households with greater than twenty years to retirement expect significantly smaller falls in consumption. Many interpretations are possible: it may be that these households intend to save more than their parents or they may be naive (in the sense of O' Donoghue & Rabin, 1999) about their ability to save for their old age. a fall is about 25%, while the mean expected increase among those expecting an increase is about 22%.
A. Expectations
These estimates of the expected decline in consumption are of similar magnitude to the estimates obtained by others of the actual decline in consumption at retirement. Hamermesh (1984) estimated that the decline in consumption at retirement was 9% over two years. Bernheim et al. (2001) estimate an average decline of 14%. Hurd and Rohwedder (2005) estimate the decline at 15%-20%. Mariger (1987) and Banks et al. (1998) estimate larger declines of greater than 30%. 9 Table 4 and figure 1 also document the substantial heterogeneity that exists in the data. While most expect spending to fall, there are a substantial number who report no change or expect spending to rise. This may point to multiple explanations for the behavior of spending at retirement, or to explanations that can accommodate this heterogeneity. For example, it may be that for some people consumption and leisure are complements and for others they are substitutes.
B. The Determinants of Expectations
In this section we investigate the determinants of the expected change in consumption. In table 5, we present the results of an ordered probit on the first part of the consumption question. The dependent variable is 1 if the respondent expects consumption to increase at retirement, Ϫ1 if the respondent expects consumption to decrease, and 0 if the respondent expects no change. Table 6 presents results of a weighted OLS regression. The dependent variable is the expected percentage change in spending.
We consider three types of controls. The first set are measures of financial well-being. Bernheim et al. (2001) have shown that the decline in consumption at retirement diminishes with income and net worth. For this reason, we include measures of household income, nonpension wealth, defined-contribution (DC) pension wealth, and debt. We separate DC wealth from other types of wealth because the motives, incentives, and process of accumulating wealth in DC pension accounts may be very different from how wealth is accumulated outside of such arrangements. For example, the terms of a pension arrangement may be determined by an employer, and there are typically restrictions or penalties for early withdrawal of such assets. In addition, because it is unclear whether households treat the value of homes and other real estate similarly to other assets, we present results using two different measures of nonpension wealth. In the leftmost columns, nonpension wealth includes real estate; in the rightmost columns, nonpension wealth includes only financial assets.
The second set of controls include variables meant to capture differences between our expenditure-based definition of consumption and the economically meaningful flow of services definition. Here we include measures of home ownership and retiree health insurance coverage. Some households may change status from owners to renters at or around retirement, and may interpret this change as a change in consumption. If someone does not have retiree health insurance coverage, they may interpret the increase in premiums as an increase in consumption. Debt, which was included among the financial measures, may also play a role here. Retired households typically have much lower debt levels than working households; the reduction in debt service may be interpreted by some as a fall in consumption. 9 Many of these studies consider log changes in consumption rather than percent changes. Given the concavity of the log transform, this tends to magnify the expected decline in consumption. When we express our data as log changes, the mean decline in consumption is 15%. Respondents were asked to provide data on the expected percentage change in spending at retirement. Forty respondents indicated anticipated declines in spending of 80% or more; these reports are not included in the means and standard deviations above (see text) and are not included in the regression sample. We used the probability of response to the second part of the consumption question to adjust the mean and variance of the percent change in consumption (see text). Notes: There are 307 observations in the regressions. Dependent variable is an indicator of the expected percent change in spending at retirement: equal to 1 if the change is positive, Ϫ1 if negative, and 0 if no change. Observations weighted by 1 over the probability of response to the second part of the consumption question. Standard errors are Huber-White estimates. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical confidence for rejection of the hypothesis that the relevant coefficient is (independently) equal to 0. *** indicates rejection at better than a 1% level of confidence, ** indicates rejection at better than a 5% level, and * indicates rejection at better than a 10% level.
Finally, we include a number of demographic controls such as the respondent's gender, marital status, number of children, years to retirement, and indicators of education and occupation.
The main result of this analysis is a robust correlation between financial status and the decline in consumption at retirement. Less wealthy households expect greater declines in consumption at retirement. This relationship is strongest for nonpension wealth, but other financial variables such as defined-contribution pension assets, income, and debt show similar, albeit less consistently significant, effects. 10 A second finding is that variation in the expected change in consumption at retirement does not appear to be the result of ambiguities in the definition of consumption. The indicators of potential ambiguities are statistically insignificant, except for debt which may also be an indicator of the financial position of the household. As previously noted, debt may affect respondents' perceived spending since debt levels are generally lower in retirement. Another possibility is that debt levels proxy for self-control problems that cause consumption to vary more closely with income than it would in the standard life cycle model. 11 More research is needed to clarify the relationship between debt and consumption in retirement. 12 We investigated a number of alternative specifications of the regressions in tables 5 and 6. We dropped households with heads over the age of 65, since people who choose to continue working might somehow be different. We included dummy variables for zero, one, two, and three or more children, since family size may not affect consumption linearly. We limited the sample to those within ten years of retirement. None of these alterations affected the results in any significant way.
We conclude that the correlation between wealth and the decline in consumption at retirement is not the result of a surprise occurring at retirement. One possible explanation would be based on differences in the desire to save for retirement. If households differ in their preference for consumption in retirement relative to consumption in the working years, then those who desire a higher relative level of retirement consumption will be accumulating more wealth in order to pay for it. Another possible explanation would be based on differences in self-control. Households with less self-control may accumulate less wealth and see their consumption decline along with their income at retirement. Table 7 presents simple summary statistics of the answers of retired households to both parts of the retirementconsumption question. The first set of rows relate to all retired households, while the second set refer only to those who retired within the last ten years.
C. Realizations
The main finding is immediately obvious: retired households, even those who retired recently, have generally had 12 One puzzling finding is the negative and highly significant coefficient in the ordered probit regression on the indicator that the respondent has a defined-benefit plan. One possibility is that paradoxically this too proxies for a weak financial position. Defined-benefit plan participants tend to hold fewer assets, and much fewer defined-contribution assets, than do the rest of the sample. Other characteristics of the two groups are similar. Notes: There are 307 observations in the regressions. Dependent variable is the expected percent change in spending at retirement. Observations weighted by 1 over the probability of response to the second part of the consumption question. Standard errors are Huber-White estimates. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical confidence for rejection of the hypothesis that the relevant coefficient is (independently) equal to 0, *** indicates rejection at better than a 1% level of confidence, ** indicates rejection at better than a 5% level, and * indicates rejection at better than a 10% level. smaller falls in consumption than is anticipated by those who are still working. While more than 55% of working households in our sample expect consumption to fall, less than 40% of the retired reported that they had experienced such a fall. On the other side of this, while less than 10% of working households in our sample expect consumption to rise, nearly 20% of the retired households experienced such a rise. The mean expected change in consumption at retirement is Ϫ4.6 percentage points, as compared to an expected change of Ϫ11.3 for working households. The final rows of table 7 give numbers for those who retired in the last ten years either at age 62 or age 65. The fact that the results are essentially identical for this group is relevant to theories that stress the importance of shocks that induce early retirement in causing expectations to diverge from outcomes. On the one hand, as in Hausman and Paquette (1987) , retirement may coincide with a negative health shock, or even with the negative wealth shock of being fired. In this case, we would expect those who retire early to consume less in retirement than expected. On the other hand, it may be that households who get unusually positive wealth shocks tend to retire quickly, in which case consumption realizations will exceed prior expectations. The reason that ages 62 and 65 play a special role in evaluating the importance of these effects is that they are known to be especially prevalent as years of retirement (Phelan & Rust, 1997) . Our data reveal that fully one-third of retirees who report a retirement date give one of these two ages, while close to 40% of those who are still working report expecting to retire at one of these two ages. It is therefore reasonable to conjecture that most who retired at 62 or 65 did so according to a prior vision little impacted by shocks to health or wealth. The fact that this makes little difference to the outcomes suggests that retirement-age shocks do not account for the observed wedge between expectations and outcomes. 13
IV. Discussion
A. Explaining the Difference between Expectations and Realizations
At first view, the results reported above cast strong doubt on the "negative shock" hypothesis of Banks et al. (1998) . The shock, if there is one, appears to go in the opposite direction. What then explains the difference between expectations and realizations?
There are three possibilities. First, instead of receiving a negative shock to wealth at retirement, our retired households may have been pleasantly surprised by a positive shock to their retirement resources. Second, differences in the samples may explain the differences between expectations and outcomes. We do not have a panel data set. The data on realizations are supplied by different households than the data on expectations. Third, the retired may have discovered upon retirement that their needs were greater than anticipated, and decided to cut their planned bequests. We discuss each of these possibilities in turn, beginning with the first.
Positive Surprise: It must be recognized that this sample is drawn from a very particular time in which the equity boom induced a positive shock to the asset portfolios of many households. Those retiring in the late 1990s may have had large increases in financial wealth, leading to significant increases in consumption at the time of retirement. Households who had not yet retired are likely to have responded to such windfall gains by increasing both current and expected future consumption. For this reason, our measures of realizations for retirees may systematically exceed our measures of expectations for preretirees. The potential power of this effect in our sample is highlighted by the fact that equity shares are large. The median working household in our sample has more than 50% of its financial wealth in equities. Even among retirees, who generally hold fewer stocks, the median share of financial wealth in equities is close to 40%. In stark contrast, the median equity share in the general population of retired households is at or close to zero.
To investigate the effect that equity holdings have on the observed differences between expectations and outcomes, we pool our sample. This will also allow us to investigate the importance of differences between the characteristics of the two subsamples. We make two assumptions: (1) that consumption expectations depend on demographic characteristics and retirement wealth, and (2) that any expectational errors are uncorrelated with these characteristics. With these assumptions, we can pool our two samples, subject to two adjustments. First, because retirees are reporting realizations and preretirees are reporting expectations, we expect heteroskedasticity in the errors across the two subsamples. We use a Huber-White calculation to correct for this heteroskedasticity. Second, whereas for nonretirees current wealth and portfolio allocations are uncorrelated with any shock occurring at retirement, current wealth and portfolio allocations for retirees will be correlated with any unanticipated increases in wealth that occurred at the time of retirement. We can exploit this difference to test for the impact of such surprises on consumption changes. By interacting wealth and portfolio shares with an indicator of retirement, we can pick up the correlation with news at retirement.
We use a simple regression to confirm that equities appear to play a large part in explaining the high realized level of retirement consumption, and to control variation in the demographic characteristics of retirees and preretirees that may account for differences in expectations and realizations. In this regression, we interact log of net worth and 13 The table shows lower variance in the change in consumption among those who retired at 62 or 65. This suggests that those who do not retire at these ages may be subject to some combination of positive and negative shocks. equity share in financial assets with a retirement status indicator, and test whether these variables are related to differences between expected and actual changes in consumption at retirement. Table 8 summarizes results of a pooled regression. 14 As hypothesized, we find that the equity effect is entirely irrelevant for working households, yet has a significant positive impact on actual consumption among retired households. Once the equity effect is removed, there appears to be no significant impact of retirement on the change in consumption. In fact the test for the joint significance of the retirement dummy and the retirement wealth coefficient has a p-value of only 0.3.
The average equity share for retirees is roughly 60%. Given the estimated coefficient on the equity share, we would expect that a 65-year-old household with no equity would have a decline in consumption at retirement that is 18% greater than average. This is about the same order of magnitude as the gap between the expectations of our working households and the realizations of our retirees.
These results are of course only suggestive of an effect of equity on the realized change in consumption at retirement. Any formal comparison has to take account of the possibility that people reallocate their portfolios at retirement. We cannot control for this effect in our cross-sectional data. 15 Demographic Differences: To investigate demographic differences, we first regressed the indicator of retirement on our demographic characteristics. The retired were less likely to have kids, less likely to never have been married, and more likely to have long-term-care insurance. Since none of these variables have been found to affect either expectations or realizations, this type of sample selection does not appear to explain the difference between expectations and outcomes.
We also investigated whether the demographic characteristics had different effects on the expectations of the working and the realizations of the retired. Beyond the effect of equity already discussed, no other variable had a differential effect.
Another type of selection that in principle may matter is the selection into retirement. If those with certain expectations are more likely to retire early, then we may see a difference between the expectations of the nonretired and the realizations of the retired. To evaluate this possibility, we re-ran the regression of table 8, considering only respondents who either retire at 62 or 65 or plan to do so. The idea is that considering only standard retirement ages should reduce this early-retirement selection problem. The results of this regression were qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in table 8, suggesting that this type of selection is not driving the difference between expectations and outcomes.
We can find no evidence that selection is driving the difference.
Spending: Our third candidate is that some agents are surprised by the cost of retirement, and that they cut bequests as a result. To get at this possibility we asked retired households the following:
• If you are currently retired, how do your spending needs in retirement compare with those you expected before you retired: -About what you expected -Higher than you expected -Lower than you expected Table 9 presents basic data on this spending-needs question. The dominant feature is the large number who report not having been surprised. The second feature is the apparent, if small, bias in the direction of surprise. More households report 14 We also ran the regression for the retired and nonretired households separately. The effect of the nonwealth variables were remarkably consistent across samples.
15 Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) provide evidence that very few individuals reallocate portfolios at retirement. Those who do tend to move away from stocks. being surprised by how high were their expenses in retirement rather than by how low they were. We regressed the reported change in consumption at retirement on the answers to the spending-needs question and the additional controls included in table 5. As expected, a surprise increase in spending needs lessens the fall in consumption at retirement. The effect is large and significant and explains a significant portion of the cross-sectional variance in the realized change in consumption at retirement. The coefficient on the spending-needs question is 0.68 (note that both the change in consumption and the surprise in spending needs are coded such that 0.01 is 1%), which given the standard error of 0.22 is significant at the 0.3% level. A one-standard-deviation increase in spending needs is a change of 0.11, which given the estimated coefficient, gives rise to a 7-percentage-point increase in consumption at retirement.
In spite of this large effect, these surprises do not go far in explaining differences that we have seen between expectations and outcomes. The mean answer to the spendingneeds question is 0.0035. Given the estimated coefficient, this can explain retirement consumption that is about onequarter of a percentage point higher than expected.
We conclude that portfolio effects are the main candidate to explain the difference between expectations and outcomes in our sample.
B. Discrete or Gradual Change?
We want to interpret the answers to our consumption question as pertaining to the discrete change in spending that appears to occur at or around the time of retirement. For this reason the question refers to "dramatic" changes "upon" or "at" retirement. Still, it is possible that some respondents may have interpreted the question as pertaining to the change in some average of consumption during pre-and postretirement years. If consumption is declining over time, as most studies of retirement consumption find, then these agents might report a decline in consumption even though they do not experience a break at retirement.
We believe that the evidence favors the change-atretirement interpretation over the average-of-pre-andpostretirement misinterpretation for several reasons. There are two ways in which one might average consumption prior to retirement: average over a fixed horizon or average over the remaining years to retirement. If respondents were averaging their consumption between the date of response and retirement, we would expect either age to be positive and significant or years-to-retirement to be negative and significant in the regressions of tables 5 and 6. In fact these coefficients are either insignificant or of the wrong sign. 16 If they were averaging over a fixed horizon, we would expect the stock holdings to affect the expected change in consumption, as it does the realized change. Working households, however, do not appear to be averaging their pre-and postboom consumption. We also see little evidence of averaging among the retired. In table 7, those within ten years of retirement report similar declines as the sample as a whole.
Finally, even if the question were misinterpreted, the answers are still interesting. Any surprise reduction in consumption at retirement would show up as a systematic difference between expectations and outcomes. The finding that there is no such gap seems rather powerful, especially given that the decline in consumption at retirement is generally regarded as being an order of magnitude greater than the trend in consumption before or after retirement. The only way to rescue the surprise is to claim that there is a systematically different interpretation of the question between those in the preretirement and the postretirement periods.
V. Concluding Remarks
While sharp, the fall in spending at retirement may nevertheless be anticipated well in advance. We find in our sample of TIAA-CREF participants that the expected decline in spending among the nonretired roughly matches the decline in spending at retirement reported by the retired.
Our findings suggest exploring theories in which a significant fall in spending at retirement is anticipated. Any theory of anticipated declines has to find a way around the smoothing properties of the consumption Euler equation. There are many possibilities: there may be systematic shifts in marginal utility, due to, for example, nonseparabilities between consumption and leisure; the retired may face lower prices due to greater search effort (Aguiar & Hurst, 2005) ; consumption may be more certain in retirement due to greater attention and planning (Ameriks, Caplin, & Leahy, 2004) ; or self-control problems may cause spending to track income (Laibson, Repetto, & Tobacman, 2003) . The heterogeneity in expected spending changes suggests that there may be multiple explanations.
